



Consumer prices, held back by the recession and an-
other ~
1
wp in gasoline and carprices, nDse only two-tenths
of one pcrc~it in Fehroary fronD January’s level, contin-
uing the sharp decline in the inflation rat It shows a
steady decline in in flation over the past several months)
rr
.1 tIE above excerpt is a perfect example of mis-
infonnation. a problem that stems Coin coufosing the
measurement ofpriee change with the measurement
and causes ofinflation. The foil nrc to distinguish the
symptoms — like changing gasoline prices — from
the causes of inflation can lead to serious policy
errors.
This article presents evidence to support the
hypothesis which states that efforts to counteract
short-term price changes generally are unnecessary
tmd counterproductive ,2 We begin bx analyzing the
behavior of the indliyidlual components of the per-
sonal consumption expenditures index to determine
the <<causes” of observed quarterly changes in the
Lawrence S. Davidson, an ~issociateprolessor ol husiness ccii-
nOniics and pnhlie polic at Indiana cniversitv, is a visilitig
scholar at the Federal Beseive Bank of St. Louis.
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’T’l~iisdoes not iilplv. lr>wcv.’r. that such prier:’ chan.ces i:hi
impose cosk on c.:ertaiii groi.ips. .I’ol ic:vinake rs nicav v••ish to erisict
legislation to add re.ss these pi’iihlcnis. it is armed here only that
snch increases do not warrant inacroecrnoiiiiic reoiechial ~Oi icr.
Alan Blinder conies to the sanie csinclnsiois: ‘‘ From the macro
perspective, the voiatil ito: .mf the Cl’I often distrac.’i:s att:’ntion
Ironi the ecnnomnivs m.mni.~.lerlyingor i:i~ise1 me nit:e oh infl~itnni
speculate that extreinie Sw ngs in th:’ dI.IL in Hation rate (DeeD—
sionahlv contrihute to extreme swings hi national eeonomriic
poiicy.’’ Alan El iridm.~.’r, ‘‘‘Thi..:. (.~.P,nssinucr Price Index amid the
Nieasuiremneut of Recenmtluflation,’’ Bi’ookincs Pmm/Dcr.s oui Leo—
uis’inic \cticitij it chruary 1980), p. 564.
average price level. We then analyze the pen orin—
ance of a variable series con strueted to approximate
the cyclical or nontrend movements in the measured
inflation rate. An analysis of this series reveals why
the public should be reluctant to pressure poi ic—
makers into reacting quickly to even large short-run
changes in the measured inflation rate. Finally we
present data nh ich siiggest that monetary p0 licies to
combat short—run changes in the in flation rate raise
the risk of increasing the underlying or long—term
trend of inflation.




The mneasum’ement of inflation necessarily begins
with a price index. ihe most widely known and usedl
index is the consumer price index (CPU, all index of
the average price o[a fixed basket of goodis and serv-
ices chosen by a typical urban family. The fixed—
weight personal consumption expenditures price
index (PCEI), though similar in most respects to the
CP1, is preferable to it in one particular aspect— its
treatment of’ the weight of housing costs .~ ihe imn-
portant points for our discussion are:
Ii ‘the PURl is axveightcd axerage oh indivvlital goods
pri d’d’ 5.
t2t ‘flie value oh the PULl in any given mouth can he
greatly imiuhi teuced 1w changes ui tilt’ price of iuirli-
itlual coinnil milit~es.
The measurect inflation rate is a simple niathe-
mnati cal transformation of the above price index. For
example, instead ofsaying that the value ofthe PCI-H
rose from 110 to 104. the inflation rate expresses this
l~or (rio re on this prohlcmri. see RI inder, ‘‘The (:nrisuimnier Price
mdc’s auDi the \ieasnrenieuut of Recent I nllatiori, pp. 539-65.
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price rise as a percentage change. In the above ctx—
anTple, we would say that the inflation rate was 4
104 — 100
percent, d)~( 100 ) x 100 percent.
Calculating the inflation rate in tllis way leads one
tdl the valid conclusion that a large increase in the
price ofone good (e.g., food) can cause a large change
in the value of the PCF:I and, therefore, in the inca—
sured inflation rate, It is incorrect, however, to say’
that food prices cause inflation.
This is because the arithmetic view tells only part
of the story. Individual prices rise and fitlI, often in
seemingl random onmd unpredictable way’s. Econ—
omnists call these re/a tire price changes (since md—
vidnal prices are changing relative to one another).
Monetary and fiscal policy are not designed to he
effective iii changing relative prices. ihese and
other illacrO stabilization policies are better stuted to
affect the joint moyenlent (If all prices, or inflation.
To understand inflation, we ulust first distinguish
between inflation and relative pnce changes. Rela-
tive prices are (letermined by the supply and de-
mandconditions in the markets forindividual goods.
For example, suppose that there were a change in
peoples tastes tllat caused them to spend mllOre
tlleir income on recreation and less on durable
goods, while other saving and spending plans re-
mained the same. This change in relative demand
should raise the relative price of recreational goods
and services while lowering that of durahles . Since
total spending remains unchanged, the total demand
for all goods and services is unchanged; only the
allocation (If demand across markets has been
altered, Thc’refore. the overall price level is the
same; only relative prices have changed.
If individuals temporarily redluced saving so they’
cOil Id c’onti 91 ne pmtrehasin g the sanmc’ amount (If
clurablc’ goods while purchasing more recreational
services, then the total do1 lar demand and the price
level would be higher.4 Individuals would lIt’ acting
as if they were given more income, causing them to
spend more. Once they’ replc’uish their savings.
however, total demand and the price level will re-
turn to their original lower levels. Thus, a permami ent
~ll all individuals ‘educed their savings, their wouhd he less
lonijahle hinds acaihDilhe or
1~
nsiiucss mvestnlent, ‘Therefore,the
liDci’ease in consmnuier spending laci1it~itemlhy tlim’ temporary rm’—
clnctioim in saving wouldhe offsetiw adecliac in hmnsiuess spenul—
tug on investment goods. Althomiglu the cousunler price index is
tcnipmurarily increased, an investmentdefl~itorwould he lo’vcr, A
c’niulhi ed umeasure of nverahl consumer amid himsiness priee~
would he uuu~ufIectechh~his ehuammge in saving.
clnuige in relative demand does not cause sustained
inflation, though it does cause permanentchanges in
relative prices and may’ cause a temporary c’homge in
the price level.
Rc’lative price changes also occur when tllere are
changes in supply conditions,~ These include rela-
tive changes in lallor productivity, wages or other
costs associated with the production process. Such
changes ill a given individual market can cause thc’
cost—per-u lit to rise, whiell in turn causes its relative
price to rise. With a given income, people who con-
tinue to buy’ tile higher—priced item will be forced to
spend lc’s5 Oil other goods, wllieh puts downward
pressure on tllese prices. This ‘<cost-pusll” example
has tIlt’ same outcome as the relative demand cmx—
ample: relative prices are Tlernlamlently changed, the
price level may change temporarily, lInt inflation is
unaffected.
In the case ofincreases in the price of inputs like
oil, whicll are usc’d to produce many’ goods, tilt’ in-
creases in theprice level may he more pervasive and
sustai led. Ifinereases in the price ofoil are pushed
through,’’ causing the retail price of most goods to
rise, individuals whose income has not similarly
ri semI are able to Ilny fewer goods and services at the
higher prices. Both the qnantit\’ demanded and
supplied are, therefore, lowered. This lower rate (If
output is permanent unless incomes rise. A tax rc’—
Ilate accompanied lly’an increase in the growth rate
(If money could temporaril~’raise incomes enough to
restore demand to the earlier ratc’ ofproduction, but
will le~tdto another uld’rea5e in the price level as
nldividlnals attenlpt to buy’ nlore of all goods.
The point of tllese exaumples is that a varic’ty of
hictors aflbcting the cost and relative demamldl strnc’—
tunes in individual markets can cause relative pric’c’s
to change. Ihe constrailt that binds the price
changes in all tIlt’ markets is total spending, or in—
cone. Witllout a coinmensurate increase ill spend-
ing, none (If these fitetors call cause all prices to rise,
that is, none can lead to a pernlanent risc’ in tile
pride index.
The Re!atiori.shi’p Between fntcttion. end
Intht. n:ute! PrC~.teCh.arige.s
A risc’ hI the mneasurc’dl iii flation rate always Il mdc’s a
great deal of information. The increase mlmav rc’sult
Dora ulore mk’tailed exphanatinui ofcost-push inflation, see Dallas
S. Batten, ‘IuH~mtinu: DIe c~nst—Pumsh\hvth,’’ this Reeo’mc lione/
July 19Sf), pp. 20—26.
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Table I
Means and Standard DevIations of Percentage Changes in
the PCEI and Its 18 Major Components1
11/1959 lV/1987 1/1988 1/1981
Standard Standard
Category Weglit Mean deviation Mean deviation
Motor vehtcles 052 1.13% 385% 506% 463%
Furniture 045 030 116 369 256
Otherdurables 017 127 189 501 336
Food 261 182 237 696 458
Clothing 082 1.66 155 381 226
Gas&oul 031 1.62 481 1058 1729
Fuel oil & coal 012 1 01 4.33 1472 2005
Other nondi.trables 081 1 18 1 29 571 3.31
Housing services .137 1 53 045 5 54 1 84
Housing operations 060 1 73 1 69 6 57 324
Transportation services 037 232 1.97 733 482
Per onal care services 019 276 1 76 7 IS 3 02
Medical services 058 376 1.88 764 409
Personal businessservices 054 3,39 344 7 11 3.23
Education & research 013 287 1 66 7 50 267
Recreation services 022 353 1 90 5 11 1.88
Religious & welfare 015 1 61 309 7 31 366
Net foreign travel 003 1 62 529 767 1498
PCEI 1,000 185 098 634 239
1Figures are average of annuali ed quarterly rates of change
from all prices using together, oi merely one price centag s of total expenditure allocated to each
rising by itself. Fuithermore, this change may prove component.
to be either temporary or permanent. Policymakers
I’he measured average yearly inflation rate more concerned with the causes of and cure for inflation .
. . than tripled from 1.85 percent in theinitial period to would find this hiddlen information highly relevant.
6.34 percent in the latter. The standard deviation, a
Consider the behavior of the individual prices of measure of dispersion arouiTdthe average, more than
goods and services mncludledi in the PCEI over the doubled. In the 1968—81 period, the annualized
past 23 years. Table 1 lists various information about quarterly inflation rate averaged 6.34 percent per
the 18 major categories that make up this index. year, but the average deviation in any particular
Because inflation generally has been higher since quarter was about 2.4 percent. This implies that the
1968, the table can be conveniently divided into two inflation rate was between 1.5 percent and 11.1 per-
periods: a nine—year period before 1968 and a 14- cent, 95 percent of the time. During this period
yearperiod afterward. The table shows the mean and
the standarddeviation forthe PCEI andeach ofits 18 ________________________________________________
components over both periods. This PCEI is a fixed— price and quantity change. The fixed-weight index is’’a Illeasure
weight version, which retains the weights from the ~ ~~‘e dluarter’to-(tuarter ~ ciIaiI~e. Once fixed, mm set of
6 . weights perfectly captm.ires the buying pattermls of the average
first quarter of 1959. The weights are the per— household over a long period oftime. We arhitrarilychose to use
weights from tile beginningof tile sampleperiod Using weights
lm’oni tIme emld ofthe period wouldnot measurably alterthe results
here. This is because the weights have not changed enougil on 8
A fixed—weight index is used ilecause variable—weight indices, ildi”idual price doillpOneilts tochange the llehavior of the over-
when (‘Den to compare quarter—to—quarter c tuange s, 01ix toge timer all menDrued inflation rate
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(1968-81), selected categories averagedl between:~
Housing services: 1.9% to 9.1%
Motor vehicles: —4.0Y~-to 14.6%
Nmel oil and coal: —-24.6cc to 54.02<3-
Fuel oil and coal prices, the fastest-growing con-
sumer prices, averaged over 14 percent per year, fol-
lowed closely bygas and oil atabout 10.6perceutper
year. Furniture (3.7 percent) and clothing (3.8 per-
cent) werethe most slowly growing consumer prices.
The evidlence fionl table 1 suggests that tile mea-
suredI inflation ofthe recent past is not the result of
all prices rising at the same rate each quarter. These
figures, however, say very little about the role of
particular relative prices as causes of sustained price
change. For example, fuel oil and coalprices rose, on
average, fluster thanany of the other prices. Butthese
increases were anything but gradlual or persistent. Of
tile 88 quarters from 11/1959 to 1/1981, the inflation
rate ofhuel oil and coal exceeded tile rate ofthe PCEI
only 45 times. That means during 43 of the quarters,
fuel oil and coal prices rose more slowly than overall
inflation. In 22 ofthese quarters, the absolute price
of fuel oil and coal fell (a negative inflation rate for
this category). During these 88 quarters, there was
not a single episode when the inflation rate on fuel
oil and coal increased for nuore thami four consectmtn-e
quarters. This patterml (though not necessarily tile
magnitude) of volatility is typical of most price
components. Chart 1, which presents tile growth
rates of the PCEI and two ofits conlponents, reveals
the oscillatory behavior of the PCEI. Note that there
has been only one episode since 1959 when the
overall PCEI inflation rate climbed consecutively
for more than three quarters. More will he said about
that episode below.
it is cumbersome to discuss each individual price
change and its irnphcations for the measured overall
inflation rate. Therefore, we introduce a summary
measure of nonproportion al or relative price
‘These confidence intervals mts suInc that qui arterlv inRation rate
changes aic normaliv d istrilitited - A normal di stribtilion roughlv
Huemui s that quarterly in flatiomi ruste Va
1
ties Ial I eq iimul I ailote itmi(I
belo’.v the mean amid that most of the values are close totIle nieiuc
The standard (leviation of a random van able Ire mu soresiiow ni Lu cli
these quarter1vi nfimition rate changes difk r from tht incan Vai tie
on the average - The 95 percentcon6dence interval coiltmui nsan’
(IllServati (liii of tI je quarter
1
> in flati0mm rmste tim itt mire rvithiim two
standard dcviati(iris of the ,neami SinCe the umean itild standmird
deviatiomm are respectively 6.34 percentand 2.39 percent,there is
a 95 percent prohahiIitv that tli e quarterly imiflmutioui rate is be—
tweell 1.5 percent f = 6.34 percent 2 (2.39 percent)) and 11.1
percemit ( = 6.34 percent + 2 (2.39 percent)). Siminiar confidence
intervals can he eonstrueteil fbr any of the in flation rate series-
changes (HELP). The RELP series is constructed as
follows: Foreach quarter, subtract the rate of change
of the overall PCEI (which is, by definition, the
average inflation rate of all components) from each of
the 18 component inflation rates. Then in ultiply the
absolute value of each (If these 18 deviations for this
quarter by its weight and add them.~This gives the
value of HELP fbr each quarter.
If all prices grow at tile same rate, HELP will equal
zero. If, however, a few prices rise significantly
faster during the quarter than the rest, the value of
HELP will rise. If these prices then dedtelerate (andl/
or ifthe others accelerate), so that all prices are again
rising more equally, HELP will fall.
As chart 2 shows, the HELP measure has a number
of interesting features:
(1) The greatest increases in HELP cmune in 1972 and
1973 during food—price shocks, during wage amid
price decontrol amid after oil llrices (lnmsdrumpled.
(2) \%‘hile the value (If HELP fell froimi the end of 1973
until 1978, it generally averaged a higher value tilmuuu
before 1973.
(:3) \‘s’llile HELP showed no obvious trend lielkire 1970,
its average value hmts lleemu rising snice then (flow
about 1.62 before 1971 to 3.46 thereafter).°
In summary, inflation has been any-thing hut a
smooth, upward transition in all prices. It is typified
byafew prices racing ahead of the others, then
falling back relatively quickly. In one episode,
HELP accelerated for seven consecutive quarters,
but this was an unusual periodi, typified by a series of
food supply shortfalls, wage and price decontrol and,
finally, tile (hI crisis.
One implication of this evidence is that individual
price changes have a significant albeit temporary’
8The 5anie category weights tised to cotistn ict the overall PCIfI
are usesi he me.
9W’h iie we have noted how HELP arithmetically eat, Des’’ price
elm am uge, others have murgiied that increases in the inflation rate
iiave coil serf liigber levels of rd atiye price elmmmge . One ~‘ansee
frouu chart 2 that there is a correlation Iletweemi time average
percentage change in the PCEI arid the average vudtie ofHELP.
-çhe imiiiieation of this fin(hog is that Iiigher average inRatioii
rmttes, which rmnse tile Va
1
tie (If RE LP, imicreasingiy comufuse ccii—
noniic agents amid raise the I iL’lili(mod (if redticed ou(put and
Isighe r une niplovmn ent ruite 5. See, for example, ?~ I mli’iO 1. 131 ejer
and Leomiardo Leiderman, On the Remul Effects of Inflmstion aum~i
Relative —Price Variahiiilv: Sonic Enspineal Evi dciIce,’’ Re cIc ic
of Ifconnun k’s- ‘iiij Sin(istics (NovenihIcr 1980), ~i~i. 539—44 and
Mi tomi Fm-lednan, Nobel Lectiire: InRation mind L
1
nenip by—
nient,Joi,nIoI ofl’oIitic(Il Ecnuiomq (June 19771, pp. 451—72.
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Chart 2




















— impact upon overall changes in the measured
inflation rate. This finding has important policy coui-
tent. Macroeconomic policies, which are dlesignedto
affect incomes or speuding, are notefficient devices
for combating the frequent and quickly reversible
relative price changes. Therefore, policy aimed
exclusively at stabilizing all changes in the inflation
rate will he unproductive. It inay even be counter-
productive if the relative price changes are both
highly unpredictable and transient.
PflCff (>flutYt.gs?
Monetarists have argued that the diomimiant dIeter—
minant of sustained spending change is money
growth. Therefkhre, tluey say, it is primarily sustained
money growth that produces inflation (a sustained
increase in the prices ofall goods and services).
Past studies have foundl that the underlying infla-
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ofthe money supply.b0 Carlson finds that, since the
1970s, about 12 quarters of past monetary growth
translate into anequalsustained change intheinfla-
tion rate. Thus,we assume thata simple 12-quarter
movingaverageofmoney growth ratesapproximates
the monetary influence on sustained inflation.11 For
example, ifthis moving average rate equals 4 per-
cent, then we assume thatmoney is responsible for
an underlying inflation rateof 4 percent in a given
quarter. Ifthe inflation rate actually is 6 percent in
that quarter, then the residual 2 percent can be at-
tributed to nonmonetary causes ofprice change.
Monetarists also believe thatthere are numerous
sources ofpricechange,yet only changes in money
growth can permanently alter the rate of inflation.
Therefore, we expectthat nonmonetary factors will
sometimes affect short-term measured inflation
rates. If these nonmonetary sources of measured
inflation arise unexpectedly overtime, and if they
only temporarily affect the inflation rate, then the
only lasting, predictable and controllable source of
inflation would be monetary growth.
Oneway todetermineifthe monetaryexplanation
ofinflation is valid is to examine the impact ofnon-
monetary influences on price changes to see ifthey
have any long-run influenceson inflation.Todo this,
we define nonmonetary price change as the mea-
sured inflation rate of a given quarter, minus the
12-quarter moving average ofmoney growth rates.
Wethenexamine thebehaviorofthisseries(referred
to as PDEV)andthe changes in it (henceforthcalled
A). The monetarist view of inflation would be sup-
ported by avariety ofevidenceaboutPDEVand A:
(1) If changes in nonmonetary inflation, A, are
temporary, then positive values ofAsoon would be
followed by negative ones. Accordingly, PDEV
would rise and then fall toward its original value.
(2) Iftheincreases in Aaretotallyreversible,then
over the sample period the sum ofthe negative As
would be exactly equal to the sum of the positive
“Keith M. Carlson, “TheLag from MoneytoPrices,” thisReview
(October 1980), pp. 3-10; and Denis S. ICanmosky, “The Link
BetweenMoney and PrIces:1970-76,” this RevIew (June1976),
pp. 17-23.
“These studies ofmoney and prices use econometric methods
and employ distributed lagfunctions. Furthermore, these rela-
tionships have been found using the overall gross national
product deflator.Therefore, this 12-quartermoving average is
only a rough approximation of the Influence ofmoney on the
trend rate ofinflation. However, this movingaverage as well as
longermovingaverages andeconometricproxies behavequite
similarly and thereforethe qualitative findings here would not
he seriously changed by using theseothermeasures. Seefoot-
notes 13 and 16 Fbi, mote details on one econometric variant.
ones. Therefore, the average value of A would
be zero,
Itis important to note thatthis discussiondoesnot
imply thatthe average value of PDEV is zero.The
average value ofPDEVneed not equal zero fortwo
reasons. First, the theory discussed here suggests
that monetary growth affects the average of all
prices.This doesnot meanthat money growth isthe
source of all changes in consumer goods prices as
measuredbythe PCEI. Second,thereare factorsthat
affect the rate of inflation for some time without
being a constant source of its variability. For ex-
ample, the trend rate of growth of labor force pro-
ductivity may keep the inflationrate above orbelow
any given sustained monetary growth rate for some
period oftime.12
(3) Even if A were transient and totally revers-
ible,there could be room forpolicy actionifit were
predictable. This would give policymalcers time to
formulateapolicy. Accordingtothe monetaristview,
negative As will follow positive ones. This rela-
tionship, however, should not allow for reliable
predictions ofA overtime.
Chart 3 presents PDEV and its change, A. From
1959 to 1981, PDEVandAaveraged —0.09and 0.01,
respectively. Prior to 1973, PDEV was generally
negative; thereafterit was positive. The overall and
subperiod averagesare shown in table 2.
Judgingfrom the average value of PDEV in the
two subperiods, money growth does not fully ex-
plain the average inflation rate in either period. In
the earlier period, inflation was 0.87 percentbelow
the 3.56percentgrowth rateofmoney.From 1973 to
1981, however, inflation was 1.21 percent above the
6.42 growth rate of money.’3
‘tOne measure of labor productivity is output per hour ofall
jersons in the private business sector. Afterincreasing ata 2.9
percent annual rate from 1961 to 1971. it rose at only a 1.2
percent annual rate from 1971 to 1980.
“As acheckonthese results,an alternative proxy for PDEV was
developed. Inthis (use,the monetiuy contribution toinflation is
estimated front an econometric price equation. This equation
relates the percentage change in the PCEI to a 12-quarter
Alinon lagon growth ratesofMl,contemporaneousand twolag
valuesofrelative energy prices, and twodummy variables for
thecontrol and decontrol phasesofthe Nixon wage-pricecon-
trols. PDEVis calculatedby subtracting fromthe actual rate of
change of the deflator its predicted value based only on the
monetarypart oftheestimated equation.
The average valueofPDEVfrom 1959 to1981 is .097,very close
tothe.090value ofthe variantreportedInthe text.The valuesof
PDEV overthe early and later subperiods ate —.54 and .50,
respectively.This versionofPDEVsuggests a smaller,but still
evident, contribution ofnonmonettuy factors to the measured
inflation rate over the two subperiods.
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MOTE Shaded area represents the 95 percent coniH ence
in contrast, the small average values ofA 0 both not correlated with past changes. Thus, persistent
periods reveal that the average s-lieiige iii PDE\ was nonnionetary efk~cts on changes in the inflation rate
nearly zero. This suggests that, although hictors are not evident, and pastvalues of A are not reliable


















level of theinflation iate, short-run s-luingsu in these ,-
I his sunpk t st s us nothing hhout the size of nonmouc ttu I Rtois tend to offset one suothc i os ci
-- ch~mgesin i DE\ , especially over specific episodes une. within the sample period - We can use a standard
Out ofSS quarters. PDFV k-Il (A was negative) 45 statistical procedure to indicate whether any given
times. Further, there were 56 times when a rise in PDEV urA is worth worrying about (large enough te
PDEV was followed by a fidi, or s-ice versa. Vsing a he considered a statistically important deviation
statistical test designee1 to measure the regu larih- of from zero). For exam pie, in chart 3, note that PDEV
these changes, we find no significant relationship is less than zero during most quarters priortu 1973. Is
between A valnes over time)4 This means that this evidence that noninonetary factors were holding
changes in the rate ofnonmonetary price change are inflation substantially below the rate dictated by
money?
74Sec Eclwart:i j. Kctrte. .Leastsinitie Sta:.c.s[ccs ants! I.~sntsFiisctrcca
(Ficirper& Row, 1968). especially pages 364-6S. For ci drsrriptisiss
cci this runs ant.
To uiswer this question, we analyze what might
be called ~large’ values of PDEV. V~diie.sof PDFV
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Table 2
Nonmonetary Price Change
1959-1972 1973 1951 1959-1981
P0EV 037°/ 121% 009°o
0055’ 015°o 0010
orA in chart 3 th it fall outside the shaded are a rue
cx iclenee that nonmonet-tr~ factors cause ci br
pric - changes)5 A n umbei (sar thicc oi foui) of
eousecut e quarte rs of large and rising i-tInes of
PDL\ orrising As xx oulel he eonsiclc ied r ide nec of
the persistent e fleetof nonmonetas x factors on piice
ch uige.
Chart 3r x eu s that the only nm of I-uge PDL\
x ilue. occuired oxci the fbur—qu-mrtc rp nod from 1J
1974 to I\ /1974.16 He e, noninon 4 in i-ictots eon—
trihuteci to inflation iisin ‘ 5 rnific~untl\ fusten th -in
monex lot on - ear.Anothe r pisodie from 11/1972 to
19s2 xx hich lie-s ne-jr the rqe etion recrion om—
priscs three qu trtc rs xxhen iufl ition .~n ex lois is
than inone x - Th se e pisode 5 clese ire adchtional c-on
siler-ition since it e onslcl be ii ~nec1 that si teni-itie
nomiionc tan fac te is c-mis ed ustmined infl-mtnou
ahoxe and be Ion the monex gioxi th site
W hat happened dunn Cr 197-1 h td its be ginning in
1\ /~ xx hen the pu ic-c s offuel oil and co-ti ro e atan
innualizecl tate nf 6-3 p n ent and “as and od psice
5
Oesr sample vie-IsIs noR- one- e-stinnatc- of the- true me-ant oFPDEV.
Ihe shaded area us chart 3 is called a ecsnfidenc-t- inte-rval. This
shows Isv how titniclt the nseani could vary itt repeated santspit-s
wnthostt rchetiitg tltat the popnlattoit ntsean is zero. Thscns, if we-
ttnokstncsther itsdepe-ntelentt sanuple asic
1
funnel a ntetnt—zc-rds value
for tine- mean that was inssic/e tine cctssficlenc:e interval, it wetnlcl
nest rehnte’ the hypothesis that the;- popnlaticnn noesuns is sc-no. The
area csestssde tlte cttnfsdenee itstervstl is cctlleel the- rejec-ticits le-
gion. Ifa sample ttteant lies in this zone-, it reiccts the hypothesis
titat tue ntectts vstltse- tif ntcnntnttcinetary itsflation is zerst. By ehsoets-
nit g a Ieve Ic c cotsficle sct~- logitcr thtst ts 95 jsc-tee itt- say 99ice scent.
SIte area iii cltart 3 wostlel ice wider antd there would he sits rtttts
P DRV valises us the n-eject is inn sen-ca - Lcswering the’ sectsfid entee
level its 90 pereesit elect-s tsotcitantge tIne resenlts, thcsttgls titere arc-
two episcsdt-s tltatnsearlylall insin the rejections region: 1/l980-I\7
1980 aittl P/1972-1571972. The fonsterpcniod witnessed severe
otI prnce slncscks while the latter, which is disc-n tssesl shore ins tIne-
a-it, cscc -s~ns-n-eel clnri ssg ‘vs uge innsel price c-es ts troIs -
1e]3
5~
econ nest’setri C: vst risent of RI)E 5-’ cli sc-n 55cc
1
ts h sotss cite t3
vie-he’s the sainst- gt-nse--nsd eonnc:ldnsionn: tlte hares-stvalises of FOES’
steccsr dtnttiisg 1974. Usinsgthis variannt cci PDEV, lsowe-s-e-n, tltc’rt
is sins series esicosssee-entivc- valisesof FDE\’ inn tine- rejecticcns strese,
This iseve-n stronsger eviclensce titans tlsstt presenstedl inn the text fcnr
the transsitccrv natnnre csf c:lsansges ins nnccnsmennne-tarv insliauions.
increased by 33 percent. ins I/1974 both energy
groups again had large anntnalizeei rate increases of
91 percent and 63 percent, respectively. These in-
creases, though very large, accounted for only about
half of the increase in the measured inflation rate of
the first quarter in 1974. In huct 17 of the 18 conn—
ponent prices accelerated —~ an historical rarity-.
By 11/1974 the inflation rate of energy items,
though still high. was failing dramatically. Judging
from food and energy- prices alone, the ox-’erall
inflation rate e-orslcl have fdllen as low as 7.4 percent
(h-ow 12.4 percent in 1/1974) had it not been for au
increase in the relative price of motor vehicles and
nondurables (other than food and energy). The
overall inflation rate staved at9.6percent in I1I~ 1974
and inc-he-cl up to 97 percent in IV/1974 despite the
fact that energy prices had leveled off. In the last
quarter, the problem appears to be the- 12 percent
increase in food prices. Given the large weight on
food prices, measured inflation could have been
dioxvn to about 8 percent or less had it not been for
this single er-cut.
To summarize, this historical period fonsneI non—
monetary sources of inflation persistently greater
than zero. It followed, however, on the heels of ass
usnpreecdentedjump in the rate of increase of energy-
prices. It appears that within six months the peak
nomnonetary efflict had been reachedl.17 Further, it
appears that events beyond the secoisel quarter of
1974 were separate- hint adiacent periods of equally
had luck. In the first quarter of 1974, nnost prices
responded to the oil crisis. If the snbseqtsen t in-
creases in motor vehicles, nonndnrahies and fooel
prices at various times in the next nine months were
related to earlier energy price increases, theis ive do
have- a single- episode. Er-en in this interpretation,
the- bulk of the effbe:t of PDEV occurred within six
monsths, and trace-s of it were sc:arce- within 12.18
The- othe-r intere-’sting episoele oeeurre-d in 1972
sx’hen inflation was beloxi- the trend growth of
money. Tbis episode shows tlsat the more- stringent
snnnc, sen tile n nnt nine tlsencl iohsss S F etccnns I ssc ns.,s Pisces
ante
1
Sisnrt-fInnss Econtcnnssie Perfcsrnsansee-,’ this Rc-n-ic-sc tjsensnnsny
198 Ic, pp. 3-17. schsss icnsnnnd 5 ver~short tie-sek inn tlse issflsstiont n-ate
ssttrshcnst:dshe tcs ensc-n-gv pro-es. I lis c-c-csssccsnse—trie- mmdcl cci the
price Ic-s c-I nnsesl tIne G\P implicit price eleflatcsr anne
1
icsenncl it to
pesek svntisist losir sinnanters aitc-r the rise’ ins c-nsergy prices.
‘‘
t
Tite l_sshscsr Dc-pscntsesc-nst ssttriicssted mIsc singe’ inserc’ssses ins Fond
price-s 55cr tine- Isest hall oh 1974 tnt poor sveatlse-r asic
1
creip hail—
ns re’s- Sc-c- Toslsnka Nakssvanssss, LIes el E_ Wigrc-nn scud Pact1
Slcsnssc-ns, ‘‘Price- Chsssssge-s in 1974 — Ass Assahysis’’ \tscnst/s/p
La/soc Re-heir tFe-icrenanv l9757 e-spe-ciallv page- 1-5.
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phase-s of the- Nixon wage—price controls eflectively
kept measure-d inflation from catc-hinsg up tes trend
rnone-\’ growth (w-hich accelerate-cl from about 5
percent at the ensdl of 1971 to 6.5 perce-nt by the iast
quarter of 1972). It is interesting that when the less
re-strie-tiye Phase III ofthe- controls began in Jannuarv
1973, PDEV quickly turnseel positive as prices begans
tes make up for lost grol tue1
-
Psioney Grorvth an.d Lntin!.ion
/iit flsntjf)intfft lOis
The previous sections stsggest that the maims cause
of s ustaineel incre-ases in nse-asurecl inflatiesn is nest
chansges in relative prices. The data pre-se-ntecl in this
section show that tlsec trend growth rate of money
rose from about 2 percent in the- early lP6Os to 7
perce-nst in the early iPSOs. This se-ction suggests that
this rising trend ste-ms from an infhrmnatioss problem.
We- already hex-c slsown that the nneasesreel inflation
rate often accelerate-s when relative prices change. If
pohe>’makers nuisreaei such temporary juere-ases as
permanent changes in the inflation rate-, they may
employ a eontractionarv mossetarv poliex’. We show
below that tight money periods have- usually fbi—
iowed large- i nc:reases in the measured inflation rate-
hut have bee-ms fksllowe-el by periesels of monetary
expansion. Atthe- c-nd ofeac-h cycle, the- trernel growth
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Shaded areas cc present periods ~f o rge pr’tce ncrease tasseng tea or none quarter- in ,t,ich its es,teanerad ettotSon rate grew fanner stso, ii irend.
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rate was greaser Simon mu treed.
Clsart 4 plots the deviations frons tresselfor hotls the-
amsnualizecl dldmartecrl\- rates of growth of tlse CPI amsd
Ml. ~° The-slsacleel x’estie-al bars represent c-pisoele-s of
largeprice increases, lastingtwo or more ejnsarteis, in
whic-Is the use-assure-elinsfiation rate- grew faster thass its
tressel. Ins each ease-, xx-e finsel tlsese ahove—tretsel pric’e
isscreases aecesnnpans ieel by large reductionss ins tlse
growth rate of sssonev afldl/or below—trend monetary
grow-th.2°
‘°_Aiseevc- we- mergenecl themet the’ PCEI is mi hcc-ttc-r nnsdmisenrd’ esi price
e-hansge, sense
1
thc-rc-fenrc- the- ctn is nnot use-el thnresnnghount tisis
article, Inn this seetfemni, however, it is inspcnrtanst ten nnse thu CPI
hc’essense’ it is ssnsssenensscceb mnnesre- re-gulsenIv (nsmonsthshy isssteacl cci
c
1
narte-rbym munich IsmininmeIsiy is ssse-eh snsnct-e wfelc—Iv, The re-smelts ins
c’hast 4 men-c- n sect gre-ste I v mel te-nt- d wIse-mm the’ 1CEl is in sc-cl inn stcseel
C151, silted- tine’ twen ce-ste-rails- nm-ness-c- tccgetlscr. Onnc innpnrtmemnt
c-xcr-pticcns oc-d-nrrd-eI ehsnrinsg tine- hirst twec ejnssertc-rs oh 1979, TIne-
smetc’ ccl c-hmusngc’ cci tIne- CPh inset-c-stsc-cl its I nestbm e~ esmertc-rs; misc’ sate’ eni
c-hsscnsgc- of mIsc’ PeTal lc-II,Thse’rc-fccre-, ii time- PCEI we-re- usc-el inn tise
meneselrsis inn the text, there- wennlci be ccnsc’ less lsistorieah e-pisoehe-
wIse—ne ntse—susnnrech innflsctieenn reese ins twen ecr insure- c-eessse-e-ntiye
et nnmis’tc’rs-
ruse-se re-eluctions, hoxyeyer, were gesserallv of
sisort durations - Chart 5 presensts the 12—qunarter
usoving axe-rage- of tlse- annsualizedl pere-enstage
change in Mi. The shaded vertical Isars re-fer to the
sasne periods of large price isscreasc as those ins chart
4. Clsart 5 shows that tlse corntractionss ins nmossey fbI—
20’h’hse, thsennc cii tinis mertie-ic- is tismet sell sisccrt—ternen e’lnmesngts ins psehc—
lisla-el innehices enb prices dc, nect ciessnaindh polie~ respccnsses. ‘[hu-
e’s-id-ntcc- - Isclueyer, sue ggc-sts tismut nines, ne tmen’s gn’cswtis hsmus (mml Ic-si
mefter Imurge shsetrt—te-mntn neeemesetre’eh pried’ inserc’mssc’ s. This cities nest
isss
5
sly thssct nmncnnsetmsry policy is stshc-l cictcmnnnnc’cl by tsrie’e
c:hsmenigc-s etr thnmct it meiwavs m-e-spcsnsds ten the-ins. ‘lIne- inehsayiesr of
ssnonc-v is elc-te-rmmsinse-eh hsv se-verse
1
fsic-tccrs. mussel ten mergnne- tinmct mull
nnsennsetarv e-isansge-s sue muttrilsntselslc- ten isrice e-lsmmnsgt weeeeieh se
inneccrrcet, Thee c-viciessee- elect-s snnggest. hseswe-ver, thnmet Imenge sisesst—
tcrnn iese’s’eose-s inn nemeasnnrs-cl innflaticsns aiccnye its 12-e~eeartc’r trensd
hi es-c- lcd-c-ni ssssc ic-imete-cl ss-ithe suds se cmi sc-nit Imunge s lnecrt—te m’s s c/c—
-n-eec -se- -‘e its tim c n-mute- ccl g remssti s eel nile cues h-nc- hense- its I
2
—c ~u msrte
tn-c- mmcl, Stmen sIc— F’iee-Iee- n-_ --Bc-I setiye- 5 hs ecc-k s - Re-I met is-c- Fric-c- Vmsri —
ahsilitv. mussel hnnflaticnn. Bucmcekieeg-s Pojcc’e-s cces Levtsoentie Actfeitsj
(Fei)rnmurv lUSt ,pp. 381—-fl - ins mini c-c-onsennnsc-tnie- insvestigmeticsn.
melsen funds eviehe’sse-e- tlnmtt nseesnec-tmin’y c:ecnstraetiecsss trmud isnflmeticsns
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I oxx-insg the-se large price inc-re-ase-s genseraIl~-Isad
only temporary effe-ets on the trend growth rate- of
money assel thereibre on a yarie-ty of nsne-asures of’
insflations.
The-se abrupt constractionss in monsc-tarx growths
ge-use-rally have been offset by si ebse-qnemnt monetary
expamnsions - Furthermnnre, these x’ariationms ins nsonne-
tars- growth hax’e- had sexere side- e-ffe-e-ts. Poole fimnels
thsat nnesnectarv decelerations ge-nsecrate-el re-eessiouarv
cossehitinus in the (in iteci States21 Batte-nn and Hafer
cnume to the sanne couclnsion in their ansahysis of the
insspact esf short—rnmss mnoue-y groxyth in tbsec Un ite-d
States, Britainm, ‘eVe-st Gerusanv muse1
~~~~y•2Q
~i~JVIjVi:::m½BY.INI) (/O.NCI.;USION
This’ar tide proyidc-s c-sidle-nec of an innfbrsenatioms
prols I enns i nslse- re-nt iin policies tlsat responn el to oh—
served changes inn tine nseasu re-el inn flationn rate-. The
ex’ielemnee is nest inscesnsiste-nst with the theenrv tlsat
short—run isesnets nf tighst nnosee fed hcsxu’ slsnrt periods
l
m
inS4lIimenne Fescue, “Tine- lke--lsuticcnsslsins enF Nlcnnse-tserv l)c-c-c-li-rseticnnss
Ten Bunsinc-cs Cye-ic- Pt- miless Amsemtise r IMeek met the- Es- ielessc-e’-- -
_/ceoeneee/ cif Fieeonee-c- (Insist’ 1975), p~s.697—712.
l2limellmes S. Bmette-ns sent! B. Ye. blmefe’r. “Slscsrt—Rnsns \ieene-s Crecsytbn
lihnsetssmeticsnns sense
1
I-Ic—mel Fe-cnnmcnnssic- kc’tiyitys Seesmsc Iuenliessticuns
lent \hennne tens I nine Ienn,_ tism Be etc nc ç\l is t982~ m~n IS 2t)
of risinsg insflatinms, Ise-Ip to qunie~klvgenecrate rcces—
sionary conditions, lead tc) sumbse-qenent lomsger
periods of expansinusary nnonetary pcsl icy and resmnlt
ins a rising trend groxvtbs rate of the nsone supply.
The infornuatioms prohlem that se-ts off the-se c c-Id-s is
tine nnisinsterpretation ofincreases in mneasured price
e-hamnge as sustaiue-d inflationn - ‘eVe- lnaye- prnx:ideel
ex-iehe-nsce that nonsnssonse-tary son re-c-s of un easnre’eI
inn Ihation are frequent, inighlx- variable and qmnieklv
sel f-re-xersible. Ihe-refore, ennplovi msg policy tes off—
se-t the-se- insehivielual shocks is eliffic-unlt to aeeonsphish
or te) justify.
This ansahysis l5mt5 broach i mph ie-ationss fbr policy—
nsake-rs - First, short—ternn changes in nseasurecl insfia—
tiomn do niot c-all fbr ann activist misDoe-tary pen1 iec\’.
Se-couel, a policy of steadily elc-e-hininsg nionse-tary
groxyth will eonntrilsnnte to more- e-eonomnic- stahilift,
while it recluse-es the- uuderls’imsg rate of insfiations.
Finally, there is a ne-eel to elistingumisis the n attnre of
thse causes e)f irneliyielnnal hoots enf’price channge- as the
first stehi ins policy fenrnntnhations - A sn nstai ned inse-reasec
in the rate ofchange ofall prices, once msnecoyereeh, is
innportant imsfornsatione xvhie-h pol ie-ynnakers cane nmse
to guide nsesnetary anne1 fiscal peslicies - Of’ course-, the
eyiclemuce reported lie-re- sumgge-sts that pnlicynnake-rs
cotnh el ignnore short—ruins nsseasm em’emsemsts of’ imiflatiesms
altogether by siusply coue-enstratissg on the appro-
priate lonsg—termns monetar target.
26